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This study assesses the plausibility of local currency contribution 
to the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) arrangement. 
First, we investigate the (net) demand for local currencies in foreign 
exchange reserves because introducing local currency contribution 
is efficient only when sufficient demand exists. The main results 
are as follows. i) Substantial demand exists for local currencies 
in foreign exchange reserves. ii) The size of the demand for local 
currencies in foreign exchange reserves is large in comparison with 
the size of the maximum withdrawal from CMIM. iii) Net demand for 
local currencies in CMIM tends to be positive. Second, the stability 
of local currencies is analyzed by calculating the exchange market 
pressure index because costs of local currency contribution to CMIM 
arrangements can be high if local currencies are unstable. The 
results suggest that several currencies of ASEAN+3 members are 
as stable as popular non-U.S. international currencies for various 
sub-periods. The results in terms of stability of the currency, 
internationalization of currency, and liberalization of capital account 
transactions, indicate that the Japanese yen, Chinese yuan, and 
Korean won could first be considered eligible for local currency 
contribution to CMIM arrangements. Overall, the results may 
support the idea of introducing local currency contribution to CMIM 
arrangements.
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I. Introduction
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) is a multilateral 
currency swap arrangement among the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong, 
China), Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3) with the purpose of addressing 
balance of payment and/or short-term liquidity difficulties in the region 
and supplementing existing international financial arrangements.1
In May 2000, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was launched by the 
ASEAN+3 countries as a bilateral currency swap arrangement. CMI was 
later upgraded to CMIM, which came into effect on 24 March 2010 with 
a total size of 120 billion U.S. dollars. Since then, various amendments 
were added to the CMIM for improvements. For example, the total size 
was doubled in 2014, and an overarching legal basis for conditionality 
was introduced in 2020 for the CMIM to support members in addressing 
their risks and vulnerabilities through policy recommendations and 
financial support. 
An interesting issue to be considered for CMIM is local currency 
contribution to the CMIM arrangements. That is, currently, U.S. dollars 
is used in the CMIM for liquidity support but local currencies may be 
further considered. This study assesses the plausibility of local currency 
contribution to the CMIM arrangements.
Using local currencies in the arrangement is efficient and reduces 
costs if receiving members need local currencies to settle trade or 
finance matters when faced with balance of payments and/or short-
term liquidity difficulties. Using local currencies directly is more efficient 
1 See Appendix 1 for a more detailed explanation.
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and less costly than exchanging local currencies for U.S. dollars, 
providing members can decrease the burden of drawing on foreign 
exchange reserves. In addition, various externalities exist, such as 
promoting trade and financial integration in the region and weakening 
the over-dependence on the U.S. dollar. However, the arrangement 
can generate costs if receiving members do not need local currencies 
when they are faced with balance of payments and/or short-term 
liquidity difficulties. In such cases, this process is inefficient and costly 
because receiving members need to exchange local currencies for U.S. 
dollars. Furthermore, exchanging local currencies for U.S. dollars may 
result in the instability of local currencies and increase the possibility 
of contagion. A detailed discussion about benefits and costs of local 
currency contribution to CMIM arrangements is provided in Section II.
Next, we investigate whether receiving members need local currencies 
in CMIM. To address the issue, we first consider whether the demand 
for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves is sufficient. The 
demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves for ASEAN+3 
is inferred by combining the demand for foreign exchange reserves and 
information on local currency usage in the region. We estimated the 
demand for foreign exchange reserves with various measures according 
to past studies2. They are three months of imports, 100 percent of short-
term debt, 20 percent of M2, and the IMF rule. The demand for local 
currencies in foreign exchange reserves is calculated by multiplying 
measures for demand for foreign exchange reserves by relevant local 
currency composition ratios. Information on local currency usage in the 
region such as currency composition data for short-term debt, foreign 
liabilities, and other portfolio liabilities and invoicing currency data for 
exports are used to calculate local currency composition ratios. We find 
substantial demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves. 
The size of the demand is sufficiently large compared with the size of 
the maximum withdrawal from CMIM. This result may support the idea 
of introducing local currency contribution to CMIM arrangements.
The net demand for local currencies in CMIM arrangements is also 
inferred by subtracting estimated actual foreign exchange reserves 
in the sense that demand for local currencies can be fully met with 
their own foreign exchange reserves, and members do not need other 
2 See Appendix 2 for a more detailed explanation.
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facilities to cover the demand for local currencies if so. We find that 
net demand for local currency in CMIM tends to be positive, possibly 
suggesting that local currency contribution to CMIM arrangements is 
acceptable, even after considering the current level of local currencies 
in actual foreign exchange reserves. We discuss this issue in detail in 
Section III.
Stability of local currencies is further examined using the exchange 
market pressure index because the costs of local currency contribution 
to CMIM arrangements can depend on such stability. We find several 
currencies of members quite stable. Currencies of China, Japan, Korea, 
and Vietnam are as stable as popular non-U.S. international currencies 
even using conservative measures. In recent years, the currencies of 
China, Japan, and Korea have been as stable as those of the U.K., 
Canada, and the E.U., and even more stable than those of Australia 
and Switzerland. The currencies of Myanmar, Vietnam, and Hong Kong 
have also been as stable as those of Australia and Switzerland.
In addition, the internationalization of a currency and the 
liberalization of capital account transactions are considered because 
they are important in implementing local currency contributions to 
CMIM arrangements. In terms of level of internationalization, the 
Japanese yen is first and the RMB, Singapore dollar, Hong Kong dollar, 
and Korean won follow in order. The degree of capital controls in these 
economies is low except for RMB. These issues are covered in Section 
IV. Conclusions with summaries are provided in Section V.
II.  Benefits and Costs of Local Currency Contribution to 
CMIM Arrangements
A. Benefits
First, concrete demand for local currencies is possible. If local 
currencies are used in settling trade and finance matters, then 
ASEAN+3 members may need local currencies to address balance 
of payments and/or short-term liquidity difficulties. When members 
need local currencies, they can obtain local currencies by exchanging 
U.S. dollars (provided by CMIM arrangements). However, using local 
currencies directly is more efficient and less costly than exchanging 
local currencies for U.S. dollars. In addition, the value of U.S. dollars 
against local currencies fluctuates over time, such that local currency 
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contribution to the CMIM arrangements is worthwhile at times when 
local currencies are needed.
Second, providing members can decrease the burden of drawing on 
foreign exchange reserves because they can provide their currencies. 
This factor is likely to be important during crisis periods when receiving 
members experience crisis and providing members are subject to 
contagion risks. Drawing on foreign exchange reserves can increase the 
contagion risks of providing members, such that providing members 
may be reluctant to draw on foreign exchange reserves and CMIM 
arrangements may not work well when receiving members experience 
crisis. However, members are likely to provide their currencies without 
much hesitation if local currencies can be provided. Fundamentally, 
each member under CMIM arrangements may need to prepare foreign 
exchange reserves for potential drawing from other members, which 
involves costs (usual costs of holding foreign exchange reserves), but 
a country is not subject to such a cost if its currency can be used. 
Similarly, local currency contribution may help increase the size of 
CMIM when ASEAN+3 wants to increase the size of CMIM because 
providing members are likely to feel lower burdens by using their 
currencies in CMIM arrangements.
Third, various positive externalities are associated with introducing 
local currency contribution to CMIM arrangements. Introducing local 
currency contribution to CMIM may promote trade and financial 
integration in the region. This introduction could also promote local 
currency use in the region and reduce the region’s overdependence on 
the U.S. dollar. This would be regarded as a positive signal for local 
currency use in the market.
B. Costs
Introducing local currency contribution to CMIM can generate 
costs if receiving members do not need local currency when they face 
balance of payments and/or short-term liquidity difficulties. Providing 
currencies such as the U.S. dollar instead of local currencies is clearly 
a better option for receiving members if the local currency is not needed 
because they need to exchange local currencies for U.S. dollars, which 
is inefficient and costly. This process is costly in two aspects. First, 
receiving members need to pay the transaction costs of exchanging 
currencies. Second, given the size of local currencies arranged in CMIM, 
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receiving members may exchange local currencies for a lesser amount 
of U.S. dollars if local currencies depreciate against the U.S. dollar. 
Generally, the instability of local currency value (against currencies 
needed) is likely an incurred cost given that the amount of currencies 
needed (that can be obtained with local currencies) is uncertain. 
Local currencies’ value can be unstable, especially during times when 
receiving members experience currency crisis, which can be contagious 
in the region.
In addition, as receiving members exchange local currencies for U.S. 
dollars (or currencies needed), local currencies are likely to depreciate 
against the U.S. dollar, possibly resulting in the instability of local 
currencies and increasing the possibility of contagion to members 
issuing local currencies. This potential problem can occur for providing 
members. If this problem occurs, then the second benefit of not drawing 
on foreign exchange reserves may disappear because this situation 
is similar to the case in which providing members draw on foreign 
exchange reserves and then purchase the same amount of foreign 
exchange reserves with local currencies. If each member decides not to 
prepare extra foreign exchange reserves, given that its currency can be 
used despite not being needed by receiving members (that is, they will 
exchange the local currency for currencies needed), then the currency 
of the providing member will be subject to extra depreciation pressure, 
possibly increasing the possibility of contagion risk.
If the size of the CMIM arrangements is defined in terms of U.S. 
dollars, then the stability of local currencies may not matter much 
for receiving members even when local currencies are used in CMIM 
because the receiving members can exchange local currencies with 
the same amount of U.S. dollars. However, ASEAN+3 may not pursue 
this arrangement because its arrangement is similar to using U.S. 
dollars (one difference may be that the transaction costs of exchanging 
local currencies for U.S. dollars fall into receiving members instead of 
providing members if arranged in such a way). In addition, if providing 
members do not prepare extra U.S. dollars for CMIM, then, as indicated 
previously, this situation can lead to the depreciation of local currencies 
and increase the chance of contagion to local currencies.
Costs are generated when receiving members do not need local 
currencies during the time of balance of payments and/or short-
term liquidity difficulties. Furthermore, first and second benefits are 
likely to disappear if local currencies are not needed during the time 
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of balance of payments and/or short-term liquidity difficulties. That 
is, when receiving countries do not need local currencies, all types 
of costs are generated potentially, but first and second benefits are 
likely to disappear. Additionally, when the stability of the value of local 
currencies is low, the exchanging cost is likely high. More seriously, 
local currencies are likely to experience a currency crisis or abrupt 
changes in the value of currency when local currencies are subject to 
high foreign exchange market pressure (that is, under high speculative 
attacks). Therefore, to discuss the plausibility of local currency 
contribution to CMIM, this study will address the following questions.
(a)  Do ASEAN+3 members need local currencies when they face 
balance of payments and/or short-term liquidity difficulties?
(b)  Are the values of local currencies stable? Are local currencies 
subject to low exchange market pressure?
III.  Demand for Local Currencies in Foreign Exchange 
Reserves and CMIM
In this chapter, we discuss whether ASEAN+3 members need local 
currencies when they are faced with balance of payments and/or 
short-term liquidity difficulties. Foreign exchange reserves and CMIM 
play a similar role, so demand for local currencies in foreign exchange 
reserves for ASEAN+3 is discussed by combining the demand for foreign 
exchange reserves and information on local currency usage in the 
region. Finally, net demand for local currencies in CMIM arrangements 
is inferred by subtracting estimated actual foreign exchange reserves 
from demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves.
A. Demand for Foreign Exchange Reserves
To infer roughly the size of foreign exchange demand for ASEAN+3 
members, we calculate various alternative measures for each ASEAN+3 
member. First, we consider three traditional measures, namely, three 
months of imports, 100 percent of short-term debt, and 20 percent of 
M2. In addition, we consider a rule suggested by IMF (2011), which 
comprises the sum of 30 percent of short-term debt, 15 percent of other 
portfolio liabilities (long-term debt and equities), 5 percent of M2, and 5 
percent of exports for flexible exchange rate regime; and the sum of 30 
percent of short-term debt, 20 percent of other portfolio liabilities (long-
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term debt and equities), 10 percent of M2, and 10 percent of exports 
for other exchange rate regimes. The IMF rule is a more comprehensive 
measure given that it considers various additional factors.
Table 1 reports the size of four measures of foreign exchange demand 
for each ASEAN+3 country, together with the actual size of foreign 
exchange reserves. In certain cases, the sizes of foreign exchange 
reserve demand are fairly different across measures in each member. 
Among the four measures, 20 percent of the M2 measure shows 
the largest number in Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam, China, and Korea. However, the IMF rule measure 
has the highest numbers in Cambodia and Lao P.D.R., and 100 percent 
of short-term debt measure has the highest number in Malaysia, 
Table 1






20% of M2 IMF rule Actual FX 
Reserves
Brunei 1,506 .. 2,103 .. 3,488
Cambodia 3,317 1,727 3,911 4,066 12,200
Indonesia 48,375 54,756 80,999 73,592 130,203
Lao P.D.R. 1,340 710 516 1,344 1,270
Malaysia 56,249 143,337 77,365 123,088 102,446
Myanmar 3,495 762 7,018 5,715 5,214
Philippines 20,951 19,963 49,551 33,179 81,565
Singapore 140,367 1,085,132 84,011 477,552 279,902
Thailand 77,689 71,904 103,640 76,020 202,562
Vietnam 56,811 19,959 69,497 65,786 49,497
China 605,728 1,109,306 4,958,823 3,197,649 3,235,350
Hong Kong 160,453 1,048,002 241,641 601,363 431,442
Japan 218,823 2,584,425 2,399,228 1,704,287 1,264,141
Korea 166,220 170,445 447,682 272,642 389,248
Note:  The IMF rule is 30 percent of short-term debt plus 15 percent of other portfolio liability 
(calculated as equity and portfolio funds share plus long-term debt securities as of 
2017 June) plus 5 percent of M2 plus 5 percent of exports for flexible exchange rate 
regime countries. Multipliers for other exchange rate regime countries are 30 percent, 
20 percent, 10 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. Short-term debt is calculated 
on a remaining maturity basis, but the figures for Cambodia, Lao P.D.R., Myanmar, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan are based on original maturity. However, some 
numbers (shown in italics) are calculated based on 2016 data, and others (underlined) 
are calculated based on 2010 data.
Source: IMF IFS/CPIS/WEO/ARA; WDI
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Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan.
We can compare the number based on each of four measures with 
the actual holdings of foreign exchange reserves (which is reported in 
the last column of Table 1). For easy comparison, Figure 1 reports the 
ratio of actual foreign exchange reserves to demand for foreign exchange 
reserves based on each of four measures. When the ratio is larger than 
1, actual foreign exchange reserves are larger than the demand for 
foreign exchange reserves calculated on the basis of each measure. In 
Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the actual foreign 
exchange reserves exceed the demand for foreign exchange reserves 
based on all four measures. In Myanmar, China, and Korea, the actual 
foreign exchange reserves exceed the demand based on three measures. 
For all members, the actual foreign exchange reserves exceed the 
demand based on at least one measure.
B. Demand for Local Currencies in Foreign Exchange Reserves
In this section, we discuss the demand for local currencies in foreign 
exchange reserves. 
First, we present the types of information needed to infer the 
demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves, in addition to 
Note: The figure reports country-level averages of EIF, using value added weights
Figure 1
ratio of actual foreign exchange reserves to
DeManD for foreign exchange reserves
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information on the total reserve demand for foreign exchange reserves 
discussed in the previous section.
The demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves is likely 
to depend on local currency use in trade settlements in the sense that 
the demand for foreign exchange reserves is related to trade statistics, 
such as imports, exports, and current account, as discussed in the 
previous section. Foreign exchange reserves are needed to cover a 
certain period of imports. If local currency use in import settlements 
is large, then demand for local currency in foreign exchange reserves 
is large as well given that a large amount of local currencies would be 
needed to pay for imports.
Export earnings reflect the potential loss of foreign exchange 
provisions that can arise from a drop in external demand or terms of 
trade shock. If local currency use in export settlements is large, then 
the potential loss of local currency provisions is large; thus, the demand 
for local currency in foreign exchange reserves may be high.3
The demand for local currency in foreign exchange reserves is large if 
a large amount of local currency is needed to finance a current account 
deficit with a similar reason.4 Additionally, the current account includes 
net investment income in addition to trade in goods and services. Thus, 
local currency use in net investment income flow must be considered.
In sum, information on local currency use in trade settlements is 
3 Export earnings may be regarded as a resource that can provide foreign 
exchange reserves to a country. When a member has high local currency use 
for exports, the member can receive more local currencies. Therefore, high local 
currency use in exports may not necessarily imply that the member needs 
more demand for local currency in foreign exchange reserves. Rather, high local 
currency use in exports may imply that the member has less demand for local 
currency in foreign exchange reserves given the size of exports. That is, exports 
provide local currencies instead of international reserve currencies. Thus, the 
member may need to accumulate more international reserve currencies in 
foreign exchange reserves. However, export earnings included in the IMF rule is 
the measure to reflect the potential loss of foreign exchange provisions. Thus, 
local currency use in export settlements is treated as positively related with 
demand for local currency in foreign exchange reserves.
4 If the composition of local currency is different for credit and debit 
transactions, high local currency use in debit transactions implies high local 
currency demand in foreign exchange reserves, but high local currency usage 
in credit transactions does not necessarily imply high local currency demand in 
foreign exchange reserves.
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important to determine the demand for local currencies in foreign 
exchange reserves. High local currency use in imports implies a high 
demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves. High local 
currency usage in exports may be positively related to high demand for 
local currencies in foreign exchange reserves.
Second, local currency use in cross-border assets and liabilities is 
an important determinant of demand for local currencies in foreign 
exchange reserves. External liabilities, such as short-, medium-, and 
long-term debt, equities, and FDI, are indicators for demand for foreign 
exchange reserves because foreign investors are likely to sell these 
assets during a crisis. Therefore, when the local currency composition 
of external liabilities is large, demand for local currencies in foreign 
exchange reserves is large. Given that short-term debts are riskier and 
are likely sold more quickly than other external liabilities, the local 
currency composition of short-term debts is likely to be more important 
than that of other external liabilities.
Capital flight of domestic residents is another consideration. 
Domestic residents can sell liquid domestic assets and purchase foreign 
assets during crisis periods. If the current local currency composition 
of foreign assets can represent the composition of foreign assets that 
domestic residents would like to purchase during crisis, then the high 
local currency composition of foreign assets may suggest high demand 
for local currency in foreign exchange reserves.5
In sum, the local currency composition of foreign assets and liabilities 
is important to infer demand for local currencies in foreign exchange 
reserves. A high local currency composition of foreign liabilities and 
assets implies a high demand for local currencies in foreign exchange 
reserves.
We determine the demand for local currencies in foreign exchange 
5 However, foreign assets can be regarded as a resource for international 
reserve currencies during the crisis time. That is, domestic residents may sell 
foreign assets to obtain international reserve currencies in need during crisis. 
In that case, the high local currency composition of foreign liabilities may not 
necessarily suggest high demand for local currency in foreign exchange reserves. 
The high local currency composition of foreign liabilities given the size of foreign 
liabilities means that local currencies can be more easily obtained by selling 
foreign liabilities, but international reserve currencies can be obtained with more 
difficulties. Therefore, the high local currency composition of foreign liabilities 
may imply low demand for local currency in foreign exchange reserves.
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reserves by inferring how much local currencies are likely needed in 
the demand for foreign exchange reserves based on various measures, 
as calculated in the previous section. This means we calculate the 
likely portion of local currency demand out of total demand for foreign 
exchange reserves calculated in the previous section and multiply the 
portion by the total demand for foreign exchange reserves to obtain 
demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves. The likely 
portion of local currency demand in total demand for foreign exchange 
reserves based on each measure is calculated thus.
We use the following information on local currency shares. For the 
three-month import measure, we use the local currency proportion data 
in import settlements. For the 100 percent short-term debt measure, we 
use the local currency composition data for foreign liabilities because 
obtaining the data is difficult on currency composition for short-
term debt only. For the 20 percent of the M2 measure, we use the 
local currency composition data for foreign assets. For the IMF rule 
components, such as imports and short-term debts, the same data are 
used as explained above. For other portfolio liabilities in the IMF rule, 
we use the local currency composition data for foreign liabilities. For 
exports in the IMF rule, we use the local currency proportion data in 
export settlements.6
Relevant data on local currency shares are collected in the following 
way. For export and import local currency share data, we first use 
the survey data prepared by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research 
Office (AMRO). However, for Indonesia and Thailand, relevant data are 
collected from the web page of each central bank in which separate 
data for import and export shares are available. For the local currency 
composition of short-term debts and foreign liabilities, we first use the 
survey data. For the local currency composition of foreign asset data, 
we first use the survey data. Thereafter, we use CPIS data (Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey from IMF) for Malaysia because the relevant 
data are unavailable from the survey. We use CPIS data for Thailand 
and the Philippines given that the survey data do not provide separate 
information for foreign assets and liabilities unlike CPIS data. When 
the relevant data are unavailable, the proportion in foreign exchange 
6 This procedure might overestimate the demand for local currencies to some 
extent if precautionary demand is high for US dollars.
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market turnover data is used to approximate the share of each 
currency.
Table 2 reports the demand for all local currencies in foreign 
exchange reserves in each ASEAN+3 member. The size in U.S. dollars 
and the size as a fraction of the maximum amount of withdrawal from 
CMIM are reported. The maximum amount of withdrawal from CMIM 
is also reported for each country. We compare the demand for local 
currencies in foreign exchange reserves with the maximum amount 
of withdrawal from CMIM to infer whether local currency demand 
is sufficient for CMIM arrangements. For instance, if the demand 
for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves is smaller than the 
size of potential CMIM withdrawal, then introducing local currency 
contribution to CMIM arrangements may not be desirable because 
demand for local currencies might not be sufficient. However, if the 
former is larger than the latter, then we may further consider local 
currency contribution to CMIM arrangements because of sufficient 
demand that can be compared with the size of potential CMIM 
withdrawal. In the last row (“Total”) of Table 2, the aggregates of all 
ASEAN+3 members are reported. For the 100 percent of short-term 
debt measure and the IMF rule, we report an additional number in 
brackets for the aggregate of all ASEAN+3 members. That number 
shows the aggregate, excluding Hong Kong and Singapore. Hong Kong 
and Singapore are huge offshore financial centers, meaning that their 
demand for foreign exchange might be exaggerated when assessed 
on the basis of the size of financial assets and liabilities. To avoid 
such potential problems, we report the additional aggregate number, 
excluding Hong Kong and Singapore, for two measures that are based 
on the size of financial assets and liabilities.
The total aggregate number for all ASEAN+3 members (shown in 
the last row of Table 2) suggests the demand for local currencies is far 
larger than the maximum amount of withdrawal from CMIM based 
on all measures, except for the first measure. On the basis of the first, 
second, third, and fourth measures, the demand for local currencies 
stands at 46 percent, 204 percent, 390 percent, and 282 percent of the 
maximum withdrawal from CMIM, respectively. The aggregate numbers 
for the two measures, excluding Hong Kong and Singapore, are still 
larger than 100 percent, at 106 percent and 260 percent, respectively. 
Given that the first measure tends to be out of date, this result suggests 
that the demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves is far 
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larger than the size of the maximum withdrawal in CMIM, which may 
provide a rationale for considering local currency contribution to CMIM 
arrangements.
The demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves tends 
to be lower for most individual members than for the aggregate results 
because aggregate results include huge local currency demand in 
China. Still, seven members record demand larger than the maximum 
withdrawal from CMIM based on at least one measure. The members 
are Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, China, Hong Kong, and 
Korea. In addition, only two members have a demand that is smaller 
than 50 percent of the maximum withdrawal from CMIM based on 
all measures, namely, Indonesia and the Philippines. The ratios of 
Table 2
DeManD for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves
(usD Millions, 2017)




20% of M2 IMF rule Maximum 
withdrawal 
(CMIM)
Brunei 240 80% .. .. 335 112% .. .. 300 
Cambodia 528 44% 275 23% 623 52% 648 54% 1,199 
Indonesia 3,212 15% 4,008 18% 607 3% 3,583 16% 21,896 
Lao P.D.R. 213 71% 113 38% 82 27% 214 71% 300 
Malaysia 3,844 18% 22,574 103% 4,936 23% 13,951 64% 21,896 
Myanmar 557 93% 121 20% 1,118 186% 910 152% 600 
Philippines 859 4% 739 3% 606 3% 944 4% 21,896 
Singapore 21,090 96% 163,041 745% 12,623 58% 71,752 328% 21,896 
Thailand 5,671 26% 8,125 37% 15,053 69% 8,591 39% 21,896 
Vietnam 9,049 91% 581 6% 2,022 20% 4,773 48% 9,917 
China 12,115 50% 154,569 632% 690,955 2,826% 419,156 1,714% 24,452 
Hong Kong 24,168 398% 71,264 1,172% 16,432 270% 46,170 759% 6,079 
Japan 3,064 12% 0 0% 23,992 92% 6,668 26% 26,111 
Korea 13,131 41% 3,409 11% 53,274 165% 16,048 50% 32,255 










Note:  Figures are derived by multiplying demand for foreign exchange reserves by relevant local 
currency composition ratio. Demand for own currency is not counted. Invoicing currency data 
for import, currency composition data for short-term debt, currency composition data for 
foreign liabilities, currency composition data for other portfolio liabilities, and invoicing currency 
data for exports are used to calculate relevant local currency composition ratios for imports, 
short-term debts, M2, other portfolio liabilities (in the IMF rule) and exports (in the IMF rule), 
respectively. Currency invoicing and composition data are collected from Chapter 2, survey, 
and IMF CPIS. Foreign exchange reserves in local currency are estimated by applying the 
compositions of the RMB and yen in world international reserves (IMF COFER, 2017).
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demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves to actual 
foreign exchange reserves for Indonesia and the Philippines range from 
3 percent to 18 percent and from 3 percent to 4 percent, respectively, 
based on four measures. Overall, the results affirm substantial demand 
for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves compared with the size 
of the maximum withdrawal from CMIM for most ASEAN+3 members.
In Table 3, we calculate the demand for the Japanese yen in foreign 
exchange reserves. We see that more than half the demand for local 
currencies is in Japanese yen. The number for the sum of all ASEAN+3 
members shows that the demand for the yen is far larger than the 
maximum withdrawal from Japan in CMIM based on three measures. 
In all members, except for Indonesia and the Philippines, demand for 
the yen is larger than 95 percent of the maximum withdrawal from 
Japan in the CMIM, based on at least one measure.
Table 4 reports the demand for the RMB in foreign exchange 
reserves. Demand for the RMB is smaller than that of the yen but still 
substantial based on the aggregate numbers, showing 9 percent to 
78 percent of the maximum size of withdrawal from China. Demand 
Table 3






20% of M2 IMF rule Maximum 
withdrawal 
(CMIM)
Brunei 240 80% .. .. 335 112% .. .. 300 
Cambodia 528 44% 275 23% 623 52% 648 54% 1,199 
Indonesia 3,212 15% 4,008 18% 607 3% 3,583 16% 21,896 
Lao P.D.R. 213 71% 113 38% 82 27% 214 71% 300 
Malaysia 3,844 18% 22,574 103% 4,936 23% 13,951 64% 21,896 
Myanmar 557 93% 121 20% 1,118 186% 910 152% 600 
Philippines 859 4% 739 3% 606 3% 944 4% 21,896 
Singapore 21,090 96% 163,041 745% 12,623 58% 71,752 328% 21,896 
Thailand 5,671 26% 8,125 37% 15,053 69% 8,591 39% 21,896 
Vietnam 9,049 91% 581 6% 2,022 20% 4,773 48% 9,917 
China 12,115 50% 154,569 632% 690,955 2,826% 419,156 1,714% 24,452 
Hong Kong 24,168 398% 71,264 1,172% 16,432 270% 46,170 759% 6,079 
Japan 3,064 12% 0 0% 23,992 92% 6,668 26% 26,111 
Korea 13,131 41% 3,409 11% 53,274 165% 16,048 50% 32,255 
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for the RMB in each country is non-negligible. Except for Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand, demand for the RMB is larger than 20 
percent of the maximum withdrawal from China in CMIM, based on at 
least one measure.
Table 5 reports the demand for other currencies in foreign exchange 
reserves (excluding the yen and RMB). The demand for other currencies 
is substantial as well. The aggregate demand is larger than the 
maximum size of withdrawals from other members in the CMIM based 
on two measures. The numbers based on the four measures are 16 
percent, 80 percent (59 percent), 220 percent, and 141 percent (144 
percent). Except for Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the demand 
for local currency is larger than 20 percent of the maximum withdrawal 
from China in CMIM based on at least two measures.
Table 6 reports the aggregate ASEAN+3 demand for each local 
currency in foreign exchange reserves. Except for the Indonesian 
Table 4






20% of M2 IMF rule Maximum 
withdrawal from 
China (CMIM)
Brunei 30 35% .. .. 42 49% .. .. 86
Cambodia 66 19% 34 10% 78 23% 81 24% 342
Indonesia 307 5% 110 2% 567 9% 262 4% 6,487
Lao P.D.R. 27 31% 14 16% 10 12% 27 31% 86
Malaysia 521 8% 2,858 44% 502 8% 1,717 26% 6,487
Myanmar 70 41% 15 9% 140 82% 114 67% 171
Philippines 63 1% 20 0% 34 1% 41 1% 6,487
Singapore 2,799 43% 21,636 334% 1,675 26% 9,522 147% 6,487
Thailand 544 8% 0 0% 0 0% 37 1% 6,487
Vietnam 1,133 40% 0 0% 0 0% 438 15% 2,850
China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Hong Kong 3,199 178% 0 0% 0 0% 1,274 71% 1,796
Japan 1,969 18% 0 0% 2,399 22% 1,270 12% 10,944
Korea 1,662 15% 1,704 16% 41,187 376% 11,462 105% 10,944
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rupiah, Philippine peso, and RMB, aggregate demand for the currency 
of each member in foreign exchange reserves is larger than 100 percent 
of the maximum withdrawal from each member based on at least one 
measure. For those three members, the numbers are larger than 30 
percent based on at least one measure.
In sum, demand for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves is 
substantial. The size of the demand is large in comparison with the size 
of the maximum withdrawal from CMIM. This result can support the 
idea of introducing local currency contribution to CMIM arrangements.
C. Net Demand for Local Currencies in CMIM
In this section, net demand for local currencies in CMIM 
arrangements is inferred by subtracting estimated actual foreign 
exchange reserves from demand for local currencies in foreign exchange 
reserves calculated in Section II.B. This net demand can represent the 
Table 5
DeManD for other local currencies in foreign exchange reserves
(usD Millions, 2017)




20% of M2 IMF rule Maximum 
withdrawal 
from others
Brunei 47 40% .. .. 66 55% .. .. 118
Cambodia 104 22% 54 11% 122 26% 127 27% 473
Indonesia 1,082 13% 230 3% 0 0% 277 3% 8,126
Lao P.D.R. 42 35% 22 19% 16 14% 42 35% 118
Malaysia 1,969 24% 4,220 52% 3,863 48% 4,530 56% 8,126
Myanmar 109 46% 24 10% 219 93% 178 75% 237
Philippines 126 2% 60 1% 52 1% 93 1% 8,126
Singapore 3,116 38% 24,093 296% 1,865 23% 10,603 130% 8,126
Thailand 388 5% 5,033 62% 4,514 56% 3,789 47% 8,126
Vietnam 1,774 46% 94 2% 327 8% 892 23% 3,867
China 0 0% 34,643 256% 154,863 1146% 92,954 688% 13,508
Hong Kong 3,622 160% 0 0% 0 0% 1,442 64% 2,268
Japan 1,094 7% 0 0% 21,593 142% 5,398 36% 15,167
Korea 166 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 9,023
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demand for local currencies in CMIM arrangements after excluding the 
demand that is satisfied by the actual holding of local currency foreign 
exchange reserves.
However, the exact information on actual local currency holdings in 
foreign exchange reserves is difficult to obtain. To roughly infer the size 
of local currencies in foreign exchange reserves, we simply multiply 
the actual reserve holdings by the local currency ratio in the world 
international reserves. For local currencies, we only consider Chinese 
yuan and Japanese yen in which the numbers are provided. However, 
this method is very rough, and the correct numbers can be different 
from the numbers calculated here. Thus, we opt to use these numbers 
as rough reference points only, without drawing a strong conclusion 
Table 6





































































































































455Plausibility of local currency contribution to the cMiM
based on these numbers.
Each member can decrease the size of actual local currency holdings 
when local currency contribution to CMIM arrangements is introduced 
if the net demand is small or negative. Therefore, a small or negative net 
demand is not necessarily a big hurdle for introducing local currency 
contribution to CMIM arrangements if sufficient demand for local 
currency in foreign exchange reserves exists, as shown in the previous 
section.
Table 7 reports the net demand for local currencies in CMIM 
arrangements based on four measures. The last column of Table 7 
presents estimated numbers for actual local currency holdings. The 
estimated size of the actual foreign exchange reserves in local currencies 
tends to be smaller than the maximum withdrawal from CMIM in all 
members, except for China. The net demand for local currencies in 
Table 7
net DeManD for local currencies in cMiM
(usD Million, 2017)










Brunei 27 9% .. .. 122 41% .. .. 300 213 
Cambodia −218 −18% −471 −39% −123 −10% −98 −8% 1,199 746 
Indonesia −4,750 −22% −3,954 −18% −7,355 −34% −4,380 −20% 21,896 7,962 
Lao P.D.R. 136 45% 35 12% 4 1% 136 45% 300 78 
Malaysia −2,421 −11% 16,309 74% −1,329 −6% 7,686 35% 21,896 6,265 
Myanmar 238 40% −198 −33% 799 133% 591 99% 600 319 
Philippines −4,129 −19% −4,249 −19% −4,382 −20% −4,044 −18% 21,896 4,988 
Singapore 3,973 18% 145,924 666% −4,494 −21% 54,635 250% 21,896 17,117 
Thailand −6,716 −31% −4,262 −19% 2,666 12% −3,796 −17% 21,896 12,387 
Vietnam 6,022 61% −2,446 −25% −1,005 −10% 1,746 18% 9,917 3,027 
China −148,106 −606% −5,652 −23% 530,734 2,170% 258,935 1,059% 24,452 160,221 
Hong Kong −2,216 −36% 44,880 738% −9,952 −164% 19,786 325% 6,079 26,384 
Japan −13,202 −51% −16,265 −62% 7,727 30% −9,597 −37% 26,111 16,265 
Korea −10,672 −33% −20,395 −63% 29,470 91% −7,756 −24% 32,255 23,804 












Note: The figures are derived by subtracting estimated actual foreign exchange reserves from demand for local 
currencies in foreign exchange reserves. Demand for own currency is not counted. Invoicing currency data for 
import, currency composition data for short-term debt, currency composition data for foreign liabilities, cur-
rency composition data for other portfolio liabilities, invoicing currency data for exports are used to calculate 
relevant local currency composition ratios for imports, short-term debts, M2, other portfolio liabilities (in the 
IMF rule) and exports (in the IMF rule). Currency invoicing and composition data are collected from Chapter 2, 
survey, and IMF CPIS. Foreign exchange reserves in local currency are estimated by applying the compositions 
of RMB and yen in world international reserves (IMF COFER 2017).
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CMIM is still more than 100 percent of maximum withdrawal of CMIM 
based on the third and fourth measures for the aggregate of ASEAN+3, 
possibly suggesting sufficient demand for local currency use in CMIM 
arrangements, even after considering the existing local currency foreign 
exchange reserves. In all members, except for Cambodia, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines, net demand is positive based on at least one measure.
Table 8 reports the net demand for yen in CMIM arrangements. For 
the aggregate of ASEAN+3, net demand is 142 percent (−108 percent), 
530 percent, and 314 percent (259 percent) of maximum withdrawal 
from Japan in CMIM arrangements based on the last three measures. 
For eight members, the net demand is larger than 80 percent of the 
maximum withdrawal from Japan in CMIM. The results generally 
confirm the substantial demand of many members for the yen.
Table 9 reports the net demand for RMB in CMIM arrangements. 
For the aggregate of ASEAN+3, the net demand is positive based on 
20 percent of the M2 measure, although negative based on the other 
three measures. For members such as Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and Korea, the net demand is positive based on 
Table 8
net DeManD for Japanese Yen in foreign exchange reserves
(usD Millions, 2017)











Brunei −8 −8% .. .. 56 59% .. .. 96 171
Cambodia −238 −62% −410 −107% −174 −45% −157 −41% 384 597
Indonesia −4,546 −62% −2,700 −37% −6,329 −87% −3,325 −46% 7,283 6,369
Lao P.D.R. 83 86% 15 15% −6 −6% 83 87% 96 62
Malaysia −3,657 −50% 10,485 144% −4,441 −61% 2,693 37% 7,283 5,011
Myanmar 123 64% −173 −90% 504 262% 363 189% 192 2,55
Philippines −3,320 −46% −3,331 −46% −3,470 −48% −3,180 −44% 7,283 3,990
Singapore 1,483 20% 103,620 1,423% −4,610 −63% 37,935 521% 7,283 13,692
Thailand −5,170 −71% −6,817 −94% 630 9% −5,144 −71% 7,283 9.909
Vietnam 3,721 116% −1,934 −60% −725 −23% 1,023 32% 3,200 2,421
China −148,106 −1,353% −40,296 −368% 375,870 3,434% 165,981 1,517% 10,944 160,221
Hong Kong −3,758 −186% 50,160 2,488% −4,672 −232% 22,350 1,109% 2,016 21,104
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ..
Korea −7,737 −63% −17,336 −141% −6,953 −57% −14,454 −118% 12,288 19,040
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at least one measure, although negative numbers are found in many 
cases.
In sum, the net demand for local currency in CMIM, after subtracting 
estimated actual foreign exchange reserves, tends to be positive. This 
result suggests that room is available for introducing local currency 
contribution to CMIM arrangements, even after considering the current 
level of local currencies in actual foreign exchange reserves. However, 
this result should be interpreted with caution because the data used 
in this analysis, especially the estimates for actual foreign exchange 
reserves, are not perfect.
IV. Stability of Local Currencies
If certain parts of arranged local currencies are not needed by 
receiving the members when they experience balance of payments and/
or short-term liquidity difficulties, then this situation will be inefficient 
and costs will be involved. The receiving member will subsequently need 
to exchange local currencies for the currencies needed, such as USD. In 
Table 9
net DeManD for rMB in foreign exchange reserves
(usD Millions, 2017)











Brunei −13 −15% .. .. −1 −1% .. .. 86 43
Cambodia −83 −24% −115 −33% −71 −21% −68 −20% 342 149
Indonesia −1,286 −20% −1,483 −23% −1,026 −16% −1,331 −21% 6,487 1,593
Lao P.D.R. 11 12% −2 −2% −6 −7% 11 13% 86 16
Malaysia −733 −11% 1,604 25% −752 −12% 463 7% 6,487 1,254
Myanmar 6 3% −49 −29% 76 44% 50 29% 171 64
Philippines −935 −14% −978 −15% −964 −15% −957 −15% 6,487 998
Singapore −626 −10% 18,211 281% −1,750 −27% 6,097 94% 6,487 3,425
Thailand −1,935 −30% −2,479 −38% −2,479 −38% −2,442 −38% 6,487 2,479
Vietnam 527 18% −606 −21% −606 −21% −168 −6% 2,850 606
China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Hong Kong −2,081 −116% −5,280 −294% −5,280 −294% −4,006 −223% 1,796 5,280
Japan −14,296 −131% −16,265 −149% −13,866 −127% −14,995 −137% 10,944 16,265
Korea −3,101 −28% −3,059 −28% 36,424 333% 6,699 61% 10,944 4,763
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such a case, when local currencies are unstable, the cost is likely to be 
large.
First, we calculate the measure of volatility in the value or exchange 
rate of local currencies. If the value of local currencies is unstable, 
then receiving members would incur higher costs in exchanging local 
currencies for the currencies needed. However, this measure has one 
drawback. The volatility of the exchange rate is likely to depend on 
the exchange rate regime. For instance, if one member adopts a fixed 
exchange rate regime, then the volatility of the exchange rate is likely 
to be small, except during crisis. Nonetheless, this situation does not 
necessarily imply that the currency is stable. The country with a fixed 
exchange rate regime potentially has a greater chance of experiencing a 
currency crisis and the exchange rate volatility can be very high during 
such a crisis. Therefore, we consider the next measure.
Second, we calculate the exchange market pressure index. The 
measure captures total pressure on an exchange rate. Instead of simply 
considering exchange rate movements, the measure also considers 
the degree of foreign exchange management. Thus, the measure 
attempts to capture the size of the fundamental source of exchange 
rate instability that each member faces. For instance, we suppose, in 
a flexible exchange rate regime, the sales of domestic currency under 
an economic event leads to exchange rate depreciation. However, the 
sales of domestic currency do not lead to exchange rate depreciation in 
a fixed exchange rate regime in most cases. Instead, foreign exchange 
intervention is needed to prevent an exchange rate depreciation. 
Therefore, by considering exchange rate changes and the degree of 
foreign exchange market intervention, one may capture the total 
pressure on exchange rate or the size of the fundamental source of 
exchange rate instability that each country faces.
In addition, the exchange market pressure index has been widely 
used in past studies to measure the severity of speculative attacks and 
to define a currency crisis. If local currencies tend to be subject to large 
speculative attacks, then the currencies are more likely to experience a 
currency crisis and lose value, also leading to high costs for receiving 
and providing members (as their chance of crisis increases).
We mostly compare the stability of currencies of ASEAN+3 members 
with well-known international currencies, such as the Euro, U.K. 
pound, Canadian dollar, and Swiss franc, instead of U.S. dollars. First, 
to define the value of currency, a base currency is needed. Thus, we 
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use the U.S. dollar as the base currency. Second, U.S. dollars are likely 
more stable than other currencies. Therefore, the results should be 
interpreted with caution.7
A. Stability for the Value of Local Currencies
We first calculate the standard deviation of the growth rate of the 
value of local currencies. Ideally, we must consider the value of local 
currencies against the currencies needed for each country. However, we 
do not know the exact currency composition needed for each country. 
Therefore, we first consider the exchange rate of local currencies 
against the U.S. dollar because it is the representative international 
reserve currency. We also construct an effective exchange rate against 
the actual currency composition of foreign exchange reserves in 
the world, as reported in Currency Composition of Official Foreign 
Exchange (COFER) from IMF. In the first quarter of 2018, for allocated 
reserves, U.S. dollars, Euros, RMB, yen, pound sterling, Australian 
dollars, Canadian dollars, and Swiss francs take up 62.48 percent, 
20.39 percent, 1.39 percent, 4.81 percent, 4.68 percent, 1.70 percent, 
1.86 percent, and 0.17 percent, respectively. Other currencies make up 
2.5 percent, but we do not know the exact currency composition in that 
category. Thus, we normalize the weights of each currency to sum up to 
100 percent after excluding other currencies.
We calculate the standard deviation of the growth rate of these 
exchange rates for each ASEAN+3 member’s currency. We also calculate 
the standard deviation for six world reserve currencies outside the 
region (U.S. dollars, Euros, pound sterling, Australian dollars, Canadian 
dollars, and Swiss francs) for comparison. By using monthly data, we 
calculate the standard deviation from 2000 to 2017. We also consider 
various sub-periods, such as after 2010 to check more recent trends. In 
addition, we consider 2007–2009 to check the stability during the global 
crisis period. To check the stability during the recent U.S. tapering, we 
consider 2013 to 2017 (including taper tantrum during 2013) and 2015 
to 2017 (the periods of U.S. interest rate increase).
7 The stability of currencies may change over time. In particular, although we 
include crisis periods like global financial crisis period, the stability of currencies 
may be different when the crash risks are high. Further research on the issue 
may be worthwhile.
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The results are reported in Table 10. As expected, they depend on 
the exchange rate regime. The volatility of the exchange rate tends to 
be very high for the free floating exchange rate regime. The floating 
exchange rate regime is adopted in countries/regions with the most 
Table 10
stanDarD Deviation of exchange rate growth





















Thailand 1.4% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% U.K. 2.3% 2.1% 3.2% 2.1% 2.3%
Myanmar 1.5% 1.7% 1.3% 1.9% 2.1% Switzerland 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 1.7% 1.8%
Malaysia 1.5% 2.0% 1.6% 2.2% 2.5% Canada 2.0% 1.8% 3.2% 1.9% 2.3%
Cambodia 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% Euro 2.4% 2.2% 2.9% 1.9% 2.1%
Vietnam 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.2% 0.3% Australia 3.0% 2.4% 4.9% 2.3% 2.2%
Brunei 1.2% 1.2% 1.6% 1.1% 1.3% U.S. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Philippines 1.5% 1.1% 2.1% 1.0% 1.0%
Laos 1.6% 0.5% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4%
Indonesia 3.0% 1.7% 4.1% 2.0% 1.6%
Singapore 1.2% 1.2% 1.5% 1.1% 1.3%
China 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.8% 0.9%
Japan 2.4% 2.3% 2.8% 2.5% 2.2%
Korea 2.4% 1.9% 4.1% 1.8% 1.9%
Hong Kong 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%





















Thailand 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 1.2% U.K. 1.9% 1.8% 2.7% 1.9% 2.1%
Myanmar 1.1% 1.5% 0.5% 1.8% 2.1% Switzerland 1.9% 2.0% 1.9% 1.4% 1.5%
Malaysia 1.4% 1.8% 1.1% 2.1% 2.3% Canada 1.7% 1.6% 2.7% 1.6% 2.0%
Cambodia 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9% Euro 1.7% 1.6% 2.1% 1.4% 1.6%
Vietnam 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.6% 0.6% Australia 2.6% 2.1% 4.2% 2.1% 2.0%
Brunei 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 1.0% U.S. 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6%
Philippines 1.5% 1.1% 1.9% 1.1% 1.0%
Laos 1.6% 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6%
Indonesia 2.9% 1.7% 3.6% 2.0% 1.6%
Singapore 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0%
China 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9%
Japan 2.2% 2.2% 2.7% 2.3% 2.0%
Korea 2.2% 1.7% 3.6% 1.7% 1.9%
Hong Kong 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6%
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well-known international reserve currencies, such as the U.S., the U.K., 
Japan, Canada, Switzerland, and the E.U. The exchange rate volatility 
of those countries, except for the U.S., is fairly high. For the entire 
sample period, the standard deviation of exchange rate growth ranges 
from 2 to 2.4 percent for the exchange rate against the U.S. and from 
1.7 percent to 2.2 percent for the effective exchange rate. For the period 
after 2010, they range from 1.8 to 2.4 percent and from 1.6 percent to 
2.2 percent for the exchange rate against the U.S. and for the effective 
exchange rate, respectively. The value is low for the U.S. given that 
the exchange rate is mostly calculated against the value of its own 
currency. For the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, the volatility 
of the exchange rate is not clearly larger than these numbers for any 
members. However, this situation does not necessarily mean that the 
currencies of these members are as stable as the more well-known 
international reserve currencies. These members tend to have used a 
more rigid exchange rate regime, which may explain low volatility. For 
the other three sub-periods, the results are similar. For all ASEAN+3 
members, exchange rate volatility is not clearly larger than that of well-
known international reserve currencies. Again, this result can be mostly 
explained by the differences in exchange rate regime.
B. Exchange Market Pressure Index for Local Currencies
We also calculate the exchange market pressure index. In past 
studies, the index is widely used to identify currency crisis periods 
by capturing total pressure on an exchange rate. This measure 
can represent the size of the fundamental sources of exchange rate 
instability that can be applied to different exchange rate regimes, 
as discussed earlier. If local currencies are subject to more pressure 
or huge speculative attacks, then the currencies are more likely to 
experience a currency crisis and lose their value. This situation implies 
that receiving members need to pay high costs when they exchange 
local currencies for the currencies needed. In addition, providing 
members are more likely to experience a crisis as they have more 
pressure in the foreign exchange market, and using local currencies 
may imply more chances of a crisis in providing members.
Various measures are suggested in past studies. Here, we use the 
four alternative measures of exchange market pressure. First, we use 
the simplest form, as follows:
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where et is the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and IRt is exchange 
rate reserves (in U.S. dollars). This index sums the rate of exchange 
rate depreciation and the rate of reserve loss. The index captures total 
pressure on exchange rate from (net) sales of domestic currency. The 
sales of domestic currency would lead to an exchange rate depreciation 
if no foreign exchange intervention is conducted. If the central bank 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the exchange 
rate, then international reserves would suffer losses resulting from 
intervention. This simple index has been widely used in past studies, 
such as Aizenman and Binici (2016) and Aizenman, Lee, and Sushko 
(2012).
Second, in addition to foreign exchange market intervention, the 
monetary authority may increase the interest rate to stabilize the 
exchange rate. That is, an increase in the interest rate would fend off 
depreciation pressure on the exchange rate. Therefore, changes in the 
interest rate are added to the previous index.
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where it is domestic short-term interest rates. Sachs, Tornell, and 
Velasco (1996); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) added the short-term interest rate in the exchange 
rate market index.
The above indices are not formally derived from theoretical models. 
Thus, we also consider several indices derived from theoretical models. 
The third index is similar to the first one in having two components, 
namely, exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves. However, 
the international reserve changes are normalized by a monetary 
base. Girton and Roper (1977) contended that such normalization is 
consistent with the theoretical model, such as the monetary model of 
exchange rate.
 t t t t
t t t










where Mt is the monetary base (in domestic currency). IR is expressed 
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in U.S. dollars, but M is expressed in domestic currency. Thus, M is 
divided by e to be expressed in U.S. dollars.
The fourth index is similar to the second one, in having three 
components, namely, exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves, and 
interest rate. However, the difference is found in two aspects. First, as in 
the third measure, foreign exchange reserve changes are normalized by 
a monetary base. Second, the interest rate changes are entered with a 
negative sign. Klaasen and Jager (2011) validated that the index can be 
derived from the monetary model. The index is also used in Aizenman 
and Binici (2016).
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We calculate the average of absolute value of the index for each country 
for various sub-periods to show the stability of each currency during 
the considered periods. We use the average of absolute value because 
the non-zero value of the index implies the existence of pressure on 
exchange rate, and the size of (the absolute value of) the index shows 
the size of pressure on exchange rate. We calculate the standard 
deviation of the index and report the results in Appendix 3. The main 
implications of the results are not much different. As for the standard 
deviation of the exchange rate growth rate, we calculate the average of 
absolute value of the index for the currency of each ASEAN+3 member 
and six world reserve currencies outside the region, for 2000 to 2017, 
2010 to 2017, 2007 to 2009, 2013 to 2017, and 2015 to 2017, by using 
monthly data.
The numbers for the U.S. indicate the role of the second component 
only because the first component (growth rate of the exchange rate) 
is zero. In addition, evaluating the size of the second component may 
not be meaningful for the U.S. Therefore, comparing the results for the 
U.S. with the results for other countries/regions is difficult. We first 
compare the results for the currencies of ASEAN+3 members with those 
for the Euro, which is the second-largest international reserve currency, 
making up more than 20 percent of world reserves. The average of 
absolute value of the exchange market index for the Euro is 2.9 percent 
and 2.2 percent for 2000 to 2017 and 2010 to 2017, respectively. 
Interestingly, several currencies show an even lower number for both 
periods, namely, currencies of the Philippines, Singapore, China, Japan, 
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Korea, and Hong Kong. In addition, the currencies of Thailand, Malaysia 
and Cambodia show similar numbers. For countries/regions with well-
known international reserve currencies (U.K., Switzerland, Canada, 
the Euro area, and Japan), the average of absolute value of exchange 
market index ranges from 2.4 percent to 4.3 percent and from 2.1 
percent to 4.6 percent for 2000 to 2017 and 2010 to 2017, respectively. 
Most ASEAN+3 members have an average value that is not greater 
than those numbers. Only three members have numbers larger than 
those ranges, namely, Myanmar for the period from 2000, and Brunei 
and Laos for both periods. For 2007 to 2009, 2013 to 2017 and 2015 
to 2017, the results are similar in that the numbers for most ASEAN+3 
members are not greater than those numbers.
Table 11
average of aBsolute value of exchange Market inDex
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Thailand 2.5% 2.3% 3.3% 2.2% 2.4% U.K. 3.5% 2.7% 6.0% 2.7% 2.9%
Myanmar 5.4% 3.9% 6.3% 4.5% 3.6% Switzerland 4.3% 4.6% 5.2% 2.4% 2.6%
Malaysia 2.7% 2.6% 3.6% 2.8% 2.9% Canada 2.4% 2.1% 3.7% 1.9% 2.1%
Cambodia 2.4% 2.2% 3.3% 2.4% 2.1% Euro 2.9% 2.2% 4.5% 2.0% 2.3%
Vietnam 3.8% 4.1% 4.3% 3.4% 3.1% Australia 7.7% 7.7% 9.7% 8.4% 9.4%
Brunei 4.6% 5.8% 4.8% 5.0% 5.6% U.S. 2.0% 1.3% 4.0% 1.2% 1.2%
Philippines 2.6% 2.0% 3.4% 1.5% 1.4%
Laos 5.3% 6.9% 3.7% 7.2% 6.2%
Indonesia 3.8% 3.2% 4.7% 2.8% 2.8%
Singapore 2.1% 2.1% 2.7% 1.7% 1.9%
China 2.1% 1.4% 2.8% 1.3% 1.5%
Japan 2.5% 2.1% 2.9% 2.1% 1.9%
Korea 2.6% 2.1% 4.1% 1.9% 1.9%
Hong Kong 1.2% 1.0% 2.4% 1.0% 1.1%
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Thailand 2.5% 2.3% 3.4% 2.2% 2.4% U.K. 3.5% 2.7% 6.0% 2.7% 2.9%
Myanmar 5.4% 3.9% 6.3% 4.5% 3.6% Switzerland 4.3% 4.6% 5.2% 2.5% 2.7%
Malaysia 2.7% 2.6% 3.6% 2.8% 2.9% Canada 2.4% 2.1% 3.7% 1.9% 2.1%
Cambodia 2.4% 2.3% 3.4% 2.5% 2.1% Euro 2.8% 2.2% 4.5% 2.0% 2.3%
Vietnam 3.9% 4.3% 4.7% 3.6% 3.4% Australia 7.7% 7.7% 9.6% 8.4% 9.4%
Brunei 4.9% 5.8% 4.8% 5.0% 5.6% U.S. 2.0% 1.3% 4.1% 1.2% 1.2%
Philippines 2.7% 2.0% 3.5% 1.5% 1.4%
Laos 5.2% 6.8% 3.7% 7.2% 6.1%
Indonesia 3.9% 3.2% 4.8% 2.9% 2.8%
Singapore 2.1% 2.1% 2.8% 1.7% 1.8%
China 2.1% 1.5% 2.8% 1.5% 1.5%
Japan 2.5% 2.1% 2.9% 2.1% 1.9%
Korea 2.6% 2.1% 4.1% 1.9% 1.9%
Hong Kong 1.3% 1.0% 2.5% 1.0% 1.2%
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Thailand 6.8% 7.1% 10.4% 5.8% 6.5% U.K. 1.7% 1.6% 2.2% 1.5% 1.6%
Myanmar 1.5% 2.3% 1.0% 2.8% 2.1% Switzerland 2.7% 3.2% 2.5% 2.4% 2.7%
Malaysia 8.8% 6.6% 14.7% 5.3% 5.0% Canada 1.5% 1.4% 2.3% 1.5% 1.9%
Cambodia 3.3% 3.0% 4.8% 3.3% 3.0% Euro 1.9% 1.7% 2.3% 1.4% 1.6%
Vietnam 2.5% 2.3% 3.9% 1.9% 1.7% Australia 2.9% 2.4% 4.3% 2.5% 2.3%
Brunei 5.1% 7.7% 3.9% 7.4% 8.4% U.S. 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%
Philippines 3.9% 3.2% 4.7% 1.9% 1.7%
Laos 7.7% 5.6% 6.0% 5.6% 5.4%
Indonesia 4.5% 3.9% 5.2% 3.3% 3.3%
Singapore 5.2% 3.9% 7.1% 2.6% 2.8%
China 1.3% 1.1% 2.3% 1.0% 1.1%
Japan 1.9% 1.8% 2.3% 1.9% 1.7%
Korea 2.3% 1.9% 3.8% 1.7% 1.8%
Hong Kong 3.2% 1.8% 7.1% 1.9% 2.0%
466 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
 (4) t t t t t t
t t t
































Thailand 6.8% 7.1% 10.3% 5.8% 6.5% U.K. 1.8% 1.6% 2.4% 1.6% 1.6%
Myanmar 1.6% 2.3% 1.0% 2.8% 2.1% Switzerland 2.7% 3.2% 2.6% 2.4% 2.8%
Malaysia 8.8% 6.6% 14.8% 5.3% 5.0% Canada 1.6% 1.4% 2.4% 1.5% 1.9%
Cambodia 3.3% 2.9% 4.8% 3.3% 3.0% Euro 1.9% 1.7% 2.3% 1.4% 1.6%
Vietnam 2.6% 2.5% 3.8% 2.3% 1.8% Australia 3.0% 2.4% 4.4% 2.5% 2.3%
Brunei 5.6% 7.7% 3.9% 7.4% 8.3% U.S. 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
Philippines 3.9% 3.2% 4.7% 1.9% 1.7%
Laos 7.7% 5.6% 6.0% 5.7% 5.4%
Indonesia 4.5% 3.9% 5.2% 3.2% 3.3%
Singapore 5.2% 3.9% 7.1% 2.6% 2.8%
China 1.4% 1.2% 2.3% 1.1% 1.1%
Japan 1.9% 1.8% 2.3% 1.9% 1.7%
Korea 2.3% 1.9% 3.8% 1.7% 1.8%
Hong Kong 3.2% 1.8% 7.1% 1.9% 2.1%
The results based on the second index are similar to those from 
the first index. For all sub-periods, the numbers for the currencies of 
most ASEAN+3 members are not greater than those numbers of five 
international currencies. However, results based on the third and fourth 
indices are somewhat different in that fewer regional currencies have 
the numbers not greater than those numbers of the five international 
currencies.
On the basis of the third index, for countries with five better known 
international reserve currencies (U.K., Switzerland, Canada, E.U., 
and Japan), the average of the absolute value of the exchange market 
index ranges from 1.5 percent to 2.7 percent and from 1.4 percent to 
3.2 percent for 2000 to 2017 and 2010 to 2017, respectively. Among 
ASEAN+3 members, five (Myanmar, Vietnam, China, Japan, and Korea) 
have an average value that is not greater than those numbers. From 
2007 to 2009, the average of absolute value of the exchange market 
index ranged from 2.2 percent to 2.5 percent in the U.K., Switzerland, 
Canada, the E.U., and Japan. China and Japan have an average value 
that is smaller than those numbers. Korea, Brunei, and Vietnam show 
3.8 percent to 3.9 percent, which is larger than those numbers but still 
smaller than the number for Australia (4.3 percent), which also has 
a popular international currency. The figure ranges from 1.4 percent 
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to 2.4 percent and from 1.6 percent to 2.8 percent from 2013 to 2017 
and from 2015 to 2017, respectively, in countries with five well-known 
reserve currencies. Among ASEAN+3 members, six members (Vietnam, 
the Philippines, China, Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea) show an average 
value that is not greater than those numbers.
When we consider periods after 2010 (2010 to 2017, 2013 to 2017, 
and 2015 to 2017), China, Korea, and Japan have numbers smaller 
than 2 percent, which are similar to the numbers for the U.K., Canada, 
and the E.U. In addition, the numbers are smaller than those for 
Switzerland and Australia. Myanmar, Vietnam, and Hong Kong also 
have numbers of approximately 2 percent, which is not clearly larger 
than those for Switzerland and Australia.
The results based on the fourth index are similar to those based 
on the third index. The results based on the third and fourth indices 
suggest that currencies of at least four members (China, Japan, Korea, 
and Vietnam) are as stable as popular non-U.S. international currencies 
for various sub-periods, including global financial crisis and recent 
periods of U.S. interest rate rise. In addition, currencies of members 
such as Myanmar, Brunei, the Philippines, and Hong Kong tend to 
be as stable as popular non-U.S. international currencies at least for 
certain sub-periods. As we obtained more positive results based on 
the first two indices, these results can be regarded as conservative 
conclusions based on all these indices.
Finally, we review the results based on various exchange market 
pressure indices. The most conservative results are based on the 
third and fourth indices, which are summarized as follows. Several 
currencies of ASEAN+3 members (China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam) 
are as stable as popular non-U.S. international currencies for various 
sub-periods. In recent years, the currencies of China, Japan, and Korea 
have been as stable as those of the U.K., Canada, and the Eurozone, 
and even more stable than those of Australia and Switzerland. In recent 
years, currencies of other members, such as Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
Hong Kong, are also as stable as those of Australia and Switzerland.
C. Internationalization and Capital Controls
In addition to the stability of the currency, several other features 
such as internationalization of the currency and liberalization of 
capital account transactions are important to implement local currency 
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contributions to CMIM arrangements. When currencies are more 
internationalized and members have more liberalized capital accounts, 
receiving members are likely to feel more comfortable receiving such 
currencies given that the management and exchange of such currencies 
are easier. In this regard, we discuss the degree of internationalization 
of each currency and the degree of capital controls in each member.
We report three popular measures of currency internationalization in 
Table 12. First, we consider the extent to which each currency is used 
in official foreign exchange reserves. The proportion of each currency 
in total international reserves globally is reported. Second, we consider 
the amount of international debt securities outstanding denominated 
in each currency. We report the proportions of international debt 
securities that are outstanding denominated in each currency in total 
international debt securities of the world. Then, we consider the size 
of turnover for each currency. The proportion of the size of turnover 
Table 12





Foreign exchange market 
turnover
2014 2017 2010 2017 2010 2016
U.S. Dollars 63.67 62.72 31.66 45.07 84.86 87.58
Euros 21.03 20.15 46.93 39.20 39.04 31.39
Pounds sterling 4.07 4.54 9.87 8.27 12.88 12.80
Australian dollar 2.11 1.80 1.43 1.19 7.59 6.87
Canadian dollar 1.99 2.02 1.53 0.59 5.28 5.14
Swiss franc 0.23 0.18 1.97 0.88 6.30 4.80
Chinese renminbi 1.11 1.22 0.08 0.43 0.86 3.99
Hong Kong dollar ... ... 0.33 0.37 2.37 1.73
Japanese yen 3.45 4.89 3.70 1.80 18.99 21.62
Korean won ... ... 0.01 0.00 1.52 1.65
Indonesian rupiah ... ... 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.20
Malaysian ringgit ... ... 0.03 0.01 0.28 0.36
Philippine peso ... ... 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.14
Singapore dollar 0.06 ... 0.15 0.18 1.42 1.81
Thailand baht ... ... 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.36
Note:  “…” indicates that data are not available. Each foreign exchange transaction involves two 
currencies and the total share of all currencies in foreign exchange market turnover is 
200 percent.
Source:  IMF COFER (for 2017) and IMF survey on the holdings of currencies in official foreign 
currency assets (for 2014); BIS Quarterly Review; and BIS Triennial Central Bank 
Survey, Net–net basis, daily average in April, in percent.
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for each currency in the size of total turnover in the foreign exchange 
market around the world is reported. These three measures are 
suggested in an IMF Staff Discussion Note by Maziad et al. (2011). They 
discussed “common measures of international use of a currency include 
a currency’s use as an international reserve asset; its use in invoicing 
and settlement of international transactions; and trading volumes in 
foreign exchange markets.” We report these three measures for certain 
ASEAN+3 members and countries with popular international currencies 
for comparison. We report the number for 2010 (or 2014) and 2017 (or 
2016).
The Japanese yen is clearly one of the most popular international 
currencies in the world, following the U.S. dollar and the Euro, 
based on all three criteria. In 2016 or 2017, it was third in the world 
in terms of its share in global international reserves and in foreign 
exchange market turnover. Its share in international debt securities 
outstanding is fourth in the world. In addition, the RMB appears to 
be close to the level of minor international currencies such as the 
Swiss franc. The RMB is seventh in the world in terms of its share 
in global international reserves, just above the Swiss franc. Its share 
of international debt securities outstanding is below the other seven 
popular international currencies in foreign exchange market turnover 
rate is slightly lower than the Swiss franc and Canadian dollar. Among 
other local currencies, the Hong Kong dollar has a relatively high share 
in international debt securities outstanding, albeit slightly lower than 
that of China. The Hong Kong dollar also enjoys a higher of foreign 
exchange market turnover than other ASEAN+3 members’ currencies. 
The Singapore dollar and Korean won have relatively high shares in 
foreign exchange market turnover.
Table 13 reports the capital control measures constructed by 
Fernandez, Klein, Schindler, and Uribe (2016) for ASEAN+3 members 
and countries with popular international currencies. The measure of 
overall restrictions, inflow restrictions, and outflow restrictions are 
reported. The number is between 0 and 1. A higher number implies 
stronger restrictions. We report the measure for ASEAN+3 members and 
countries with popular international currencies. We consider Germany 
a representative country from the Euro area.
For the six countries with popular international currencies, the 
number of overall restrictions ranges from 0.05 to 0.35. Members 
such as Brunei, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea have 
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similar numbers but others such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and China have higher numbers, 
ranging from 0.63 to 0.90. The two Asian countries with the most 
popular currencies have highly different numbers. Japan has the lowest 
number of 0, showing the lowest degree of capital controls, whereas 
China’s number stands at 0.80, suggesting a high degree of capital 
controls.
In sum, the Japanese yen is one of the most popular international 
currencies in the world with a liberalized capital account. Furthermore, 
the RMB’s internationalization is at about the same level as for the 
Swiss franc, but a high degree of capital controls is still in place in 
China. The Singapore dollar, Hong Kong dollar, and Korean won are 
next in terms of their level of internationalization, and the degree of 
capital controls in these economies is low.
Finally, the results relating to currency stability, internationalization 
of the currency, and liberalization of capital account transactions 
indicate that the Japanese yen, the RMB, and the Korean won could 
Table 13
capital control Measure (fernanDez, klein, schinDler, anD uriBe, 2016)
Overall restrictions Inflow restrictions Outflow restrictions
US 0.13 0.10 0.15
Germany 0.30 0.10 0.50
UK 0.05 0.10 0.00
Switzerland 0.35 0.15 0.55
Canada 0.05 0.10 0.00
Australia 0.18 0.30 0.05
Brunei 0.05 0.10 0.00
Cambodia … ... …
Indonesia 0.63 0.65 0.60
Lao P.D.R. … … …
Malaysia 0.88 0.80 0.95
Myanmar 0.90 0.90 0.90
Philippines 0.88 0.75 1.00
Singapore 0.13 0.10 0.15
Thailand 0.73 0.70 0.75
Vietnam 0.88 0.85 0.90
China 0.80 0.80 0.80
Hong Kong 0.05 0.10 0.00
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00
Korea 0.15 0.15 0.15
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be considered first as being eligible for local currency contribution to 
CMIM.
V. Concluding Remarks
This study investigates the plausibility of local currency contribution 
to Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) arrangements. The 
results are summarized as follows. 
First, receiving members would need local currencies to settle trade 
or finance matters when faced with balance of payments and/or short-
term liquidity difficulties, considering the estimated size of (net) demand 
for local currencies in foreign exchange reserves/CMIM. The demand for 
local currencies in foreign exchange reserves is inferred by combining 
the demand for foreign exchange reserves and information on local 
currency usage in the region. The results show substantial demand for 
local currencies in foreign exchange reserves. We further calculated the 
net demand for local currencies in CMIM arrangements by subtracting 
estimated actual foreign exchange reserves from the estimated demand 
for foreign exchange reserves. The results show that net demand for 
local currency in CMIM tends to be positive, further suggesting room 
for introducing local currency contribution to CMIM arrangements. 
These results may imply that some potential benefits can be achieved 
but some potential costs can be reduced by introducing local currency 
contribution to the CMIM.
Results on the stability of local currencies also tend to support local 
currency contribution to the CMIM arrangements. We calculated the 
exchange market pressure index. Some conservative results indicate 
that the currencies of several ASEAN+3 members (China, Japan, Korea, 
and Vietnam) are as stable as popular non-U.S. international currencies 
for various sub-periods. In recent years, the currencies of China, Japan, 
and Korea have been as stable as those of the U.K., Canada, and the E.U., 
and even more stable than those of Australia and Switzerland while the 
currencies of other members such as Myanmar, Vietnam, and Hong 
Kong, have also been as stable as those of Australia and Switzerland.
In addition, we investigate the internationalization of a currency 
and the liberalization of capital account transactions because they 
are important in implementing local currency contributions to 
CMIM arrangements. The Japanese yen is one of the most popular 
international currencies in the world with liberalized capital accounts. 
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The level of internationalization of the RMB is at approximately the 
same level as the Swiss franc, but China still has a high degree of 
capital controls in place. The Singapore dollar, Hong Kong dollar, and 
Korean won are next in terms of level of internationalization, and the 
degree of capital controls in these economies is low.
Finally, the results on currency internationalization and liberalization 
of capital account transactions in addition to the results relating to 
currency stability indicate that the Japanese yen, RMB, and the Korean 
won could first be considered eligible for local currency contribution to 
the CMIM arrangements.
(Received 13 July 2020; Revised 25 July 2020; Accepted 25 July 2020)
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Appendix 1
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM)*
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) is a Regional 
Financial Arrangement (RFA) for the ASEAN + 3. RFAs are mechanisms 
or agreements through which groups of countries mutually pledge 
financial support to countries experiencing financial difficulties in their 
regions.
In May 2000, The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was launched by 
the ASEAN+3 countries as a regional currency swap arrangement 
to address the short-term liquidity difficulties in the region and to 
supplement existing international financial arrangements. CMI is 
composed of (a) the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) among ASEAN 
countries and (b) a network of bilateral swap arrangements among the 
ASEAN+3 countries.
CMIM came into effect on 24 March 2010 with a total size of USD 120 
billion. The CMIM is a multilateral currency swap arrangement among 
ASEAN+3 members, governed by a single contractual agreement, while 
the CMI is a network of bilateral swap arrangements among the “Plus 
Three” and ASEAN-5 countries’ authorities. The core objectives of the 
CMIM are (i) to address balance-of-payments and short-term liquidity 
difficulties in the region and (ii) to supplement the existing international 
financial arrangements.
The CMIM was further strengthened in 2014 through the following 
amendments: (i) to double its total size of USD 240 billion from USD 120 
billion, (ii) to introduce CMIM Precautionary Line, and (iii) to increase 
the IMF de-linked portion from 20% to 30%.
On 23 June 2020, another amendment came into effect. This 
amendment aims (i) to create more flexibilities for the financing period 
of the IMF Linked Portion of the CMIM to secure consistency with the 
IMF-supported programs and strengthen coordination mechanism with 
the IMF, (ii) to introduce an overarching legal basis for conditionality 
for the CMIM to support members in addressing their risks and 
vulnerabilities through policy recommendations as well as financial 
support, and (iii) to address other legal ambiguity issues.
* Author’s compilation based on AMRO web page (https://www.amro-asia.
org/about-amro/amro-and-the-cmim/)
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Appendix 2
Literature on Demand for Foreign Exchange Reserves
Past studies have investigated demand for foreign exchange reserves, 
foreign exchange reserve adequacy, or optimal level of foreign exchange 
reserves. During the Bretton Woods period, the main role of foreign 
exchange reserves was as a buffer against real external shocks, such 
as export drops. Exchange rates were fixed, and international financial 
market integration was limited. Thus, such shocks had more important 
effects than did financial shocks. For instance, past studies suggested 
a simple rule of three months of imports as a guideline for an adequate 
level of foreign exchange reserves. In addition to such a simple 
rule, academic studies (such as Heller, 1966) analyzed the optimal 
level of foreign exchange reserves based on cost–benefit analysis. 
Although using the results of these studies in recent years has been 
difficult, basic ideas from these studies, such as cost–benefit analysis 
and dependency of foreign exchange reserve demand on country 
characteristics, continue to be considered essential elements for foreign 
exchange reserve demand.
The Tequila and Asian crises of the 1990s suggest that preparation 
for external financial shocks in addition to external real shocks is 
crucial. Since then, the precautionary role of foreign exchange reserves 
as a buffer against abrupt capital outflows has been emphasized. For 
instance, the Greenspan–Guiddoti rule (100 percent of short-term debt) 
has been suggested in such a context. In addition, many formal studies 
on the optimal level of foreign exchange reserves were conducted based 
on various theoretical models. Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) study 
optimal precautionary reserves for a borrowing country. Flood and 
Marion (2002) find that the buffer stock model has little explanation 
power on reserve holdings, while exchange rate stability matters. 
In addition, some studies argue emerging markets have excessive 
exchange rate reserve (Edison, 2003) and attempt to give reasons such 
as export promotion (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2003), 
higher crisis risk, loss aversion and/or higher fiscal liabilities (Aizenman 
and Marion, 2003), and financial integration and crises (Aizenman and 
Lee, 2007). Some studies focus on the change of motivation to hold 
reserves. Cheung and Ito (2009) show greater importance for financial 
factors and lesser importance for trade factors over time to explain 
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reserve holding. Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) argue that 
deeper financial integration and domestic financial depth and the fear 
of floating explain exchange rate reserve patterns.
After the Global Financial Crisis, studies have discussed that foreign 
exchange reserve adequacy depends on country characteristics, such as 
economic development. Cheung and Qian (2009) show that a “keeping 
up with the Joneses” effect in reserve holding. Cheung and Ito (2009) 
reveal that a developed economy tends to hold less reserve than does 
a developing economy. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2012) show 
that differences in reserves across regions and argues that they are 
partly explained by the perceived presence of a lender of last resort or 
characteristics such as being a large oil producer.
The IMF (2011) reviewed existing approaches to reserve adequacy and 
developed some new measures. It summarized the traditional measures 
as follows: import cover, short-term debt, broad money, GDP, and 
current account. The first is the size of imports that can be sustained 
for a period, such as three months of imports. That is, a country must 
pay reserve currencies for imports with foreign exchange reserves 
when other sources are unavailable. The second is the measure of the 
size of short-term debt, for example, 100 percent of short-term debt in 
the Greenspan–Guiddoti rule. This measure means a country needs 
foreign exchange reserves to pay off short-term debts in a short period 
when short-term debts cannot be rolled-over and other sources are 
unavailable. The third is a fraction of broad money, such as M2, for 
example, 20 percent of M2. During a capital account crisis, the capital 
outflows of domestic deposits of residents are observed. This measure 
captures the risks of capital flight. The last is GDP. It is sometimes 
used, but no theoretical or empirical backing is available. GDP may 
be used as a scale factor in cross-country analysis. Finally, current 
account deficits (surpluses) imply that foreign exchange reserves are 
required (provided) if other sources are unavailable. For instance, an 
extension of the Greenspan–Guidotti rule is the size of short-term 
debt plus the current account deficit (if it is in deficit). IMF (2011) also 
mentioned a modified rule that considered the size of short-term debt 
minus the current account.
In addition to these traditional measures, the IMF (2011) suggested 
other measures that encompass a broad set of risks based on recent 
experience as follows: export earnings and medium- and long-term 
debt and equity liabilities. Export earnings reflect the potential loss 
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that could arise from a drop in external demand or terms of trade 
shock. External liability stocks, such as medium- and long-term debt 
and equities other than short-term debt, can be considered. Although 
short-term debt would be riskier, the sudden outflows of other external 
liabilities can lead to exchange rate depreciation and volatility in foreign 
exchange and financial markets. In addition, even FDI liabilities can be 
a source of drain, as observed in recent years.
Appendix 3
Standard Deviation of Exchange Market Index
Table a1
stanDarD Deviation of exchange Market inDex
(1) t t t t
t t




























Thailand 3.1% 2.9% 3.8% 2.7% 2.8% U.K. 4.8% 3.5% 7.8% 3.6% 4.0%
Myanmar 10.2% 7.2% 11.8% 8.7% 5.6% Switzerland 7.3% 7.8% 9.1% 3.0% 3.2%
Malaysia 3.7% 3.8% 4.8% 3.7% 3.9% Canada 3.4% 2.6% 5.6% 2.4% 2.6%
Cambodia 2.8% 2.7% 3.6% 3.0% 1.5% Euro 3.9% 2.8% 6.5% 2.5% 2.8%
Vietnam 5.0% 5.6% 5.5% 4.8% 4.4% Australia 9.8% 9.9% 12.0% 10.8% 11.7%
Brunei 7.6% 9.2% 8.1% 6.2% 7.0% U.S. 4.8% 1.7% 10.5% 1.5% 1.6%
Philippines 3.5% 2.8% 3.8% 1.9% 1.8%
Laos 7.3% 9.2% 4.7% 9.2% 8.0%
Indonesia 5.1% 4.1% 6.3% 3.5% 3.5%
Singapore 2.6% 2.6% 3.3% 2.0% 2.2%
China 2.1% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%
Japan 3.4% 2.9% 3.3% 2.8% 2.6%
Korea 3.7% 2.6% 6.8% 2.3% 2.4%
Hong Kong 1.8% 1.3% 3.0% 1.4% 1.5%
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Thailand 3.1% 2.9% 3.9% 2.7% 2.8% U.K. 4.8% 3.5% 7.7% 3.6% 4.0%
Myanmar 10.2% 7.2% 11.8% 8.7% 5.6% Switzerland 7.4% 7.8% 9.0% 3.0% 3.3%
Malaysia 3.7% 3.8% 4.8% 3.7% 3.9% Canada 3.4% 2.6% 5.5% 2.4% 2.6%
Cambodia 2.9% 2.7% 3.7% 3.0% 1.5% Euro 3.9% 2.8% 6.4% 2.5% 2.8%
Vietnam 5.3% 5.9% 6.0% 4.9% 4.7% Australia 9.8% 9.9% 12.0% 10.8% 11.7%
Brunei 8.1% 9.2% 8.1% 6.2% 7.0% U.S. 4.8% 1.7% 10.5% 1.5% 1.6%
Philippines 3.6% 2.8% 3.9% 1.9% 1.8%
Laos 7.3% 9.2% 4.7% 9.2% 7.9%
Indonesia 5.2% 4.1% 6.4% 3.6% 3.6%
Singapore 2.6% 2.6% 3.3% 2.0% 2.1%
China 2.1% 2.1% 1.7% 2.0% 2.0%
Japan 3.4% 2.9% 3.3% 2.8% 2.6%
Korea 3.7% 2.6% 6.7% 2.3% 2.4%
Hong Kong 1.8% 1.3% 3.0% 1.4% 1.5%
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Thailand 8.6% 8.9% 11.4% 7.3% 7.7% U.K. 2.3% 2.1% 3.2% 2.1% 2.3%
Myanmar 3.6% 5.1% 1.3% 6.3% 3.1% Switzerland 3.7% 4.3% 3.2% 2.9% 3.2%
Malaysia 13.6% 11.9% 21.2% 7.8% 7.5% Canada 2.1% 1.8% 3.3% 1.9% 2.3%
Cambodia 3.9% 3.4% 5.2% 3.8% 2.1% Euro 2.4% 2.2% 3.0% 1.9% 2.1%
Vietnam 3.3% 3.2% 4.9% 2.8% 2.4% Australia 3.8% 3.0% 5.8% 3.1% 3.0%
Brunei 8.7% 11.6% 6.3% 9.2% 10.3% U.S. 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1%
Philippines 5.4% 5.0% 5.1% 2.6% 2.2%
Laos 10.9% 7.2% 7.9% 7.1% 6.9%
Indonesia 6.1% 5.1% 6.8% 4.1% 4.2%
Singapore 6.5% 5.0% 8.0% 3.2% 3.3%
China 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Japan 2.5% 2.4% 2.9% 2.6% 2.3%
Korea 3.4% 2.4% 6.3% 2.1% 2.2%
Hong Kong 5.0% 2.4% 8.8% 2.6% 2.7%
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Thailand 8.6% 8.9% 11.2% 7.2% 7.6% U.K. 2.4% 2.1% 3.4% 2.1% 2.3%
Myanmar 3.6% 5.1% 1.3% 6.3% 3.1% Switzerland 3.7% 4.3% 3.3% 2.9% 3.3%
Malaysia 13.6% 11.8% 20.9% 7.8% 7.3% Canada 2.1% 1.8% 3.4% 1.9% 2.3%
Cambodia 4.0% 3.4% 5.2% 3.8% 2.1% Euro 2.5% 2.2% 3.0% 1.9% 2.1%
Vietnam 3.4% 3.3% 4.8% 3.1% 2.5% Australia 3.9% 3.0% 5.8% 3.0% 2.9%
Brunei 9.3% 11.5% 6.2% 9.1% 10.1% U.S. 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1%
Philippines 5.4% 5.0% 4.9% 2.6% 2.2%
Laos 11.0% 7.2% 7.8% 7.1% 6.8%
Indonesia 6.0% 5.0% 6.7% 4.0% 4.1%
Singapore 6.5% 5.0% 7.9% 3.2% 3.3%
China 1.5% 1.6% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4%
Japan 2.5% 2.4% 2.8% 2.5% 2.2%
Korea 3.4% 2.4% 6.3% 2.1% 2.2%
Hong Kong 5.0% 2.4% 8.7% 2.6% 2.7%

